Course - Computer Security MT24
A Part A/Part B course on computer security, with a heavy focus on information security.
A lot of the information security topics rely on some foundational assumptions in computational complexity, most strongly that one-way functions exist – i.e. there exist functions $f$ where $f(x)$ is easy to compute but $f^{-1}(x)$ is very difficult to compute. Whether one-way functions exist is actually still an open problem! The existence of one-way functions would imply $\mathbf P = \mathbf{NP}$, so a proof of this fact is expected to be very difficult. Some of [[Course - Quantum Information HT24]]U instead builds up protocols of secure communication founded in quantum theory, whose security is founded in laws of nature rather than hard computational problems.
- Course Webpage
- Lecture Notes
- Andrew Ker’s lecture notes (from 2014, and don’t cover all content)
- 1, Introduction
- 2, Access control
- 3, Attacks
- From the previous year:
- Other courses this term: [[Courses MT24]]U
Timetable
- Monday 11AM-12PM, Weeks 1,2,3,4,5,7 (lecture)
- Wednesday 11AM-12PM, Weeks 1,2,3,4,5,7 (lecture)
- Friday 11AM-12PM, Weeks 1-4 (lecture)
- Monday 10AM-11AM, Weekly 4,5,7,8 (class)
Notes
- [[Notes - Computer Security MT24, Basic definitions]]U
- [[Notes - Computer Security MT24, Access control]]U
- [[Notes - Computer Security MT24, Bell-LaPadula model]]U
- [[Notes - Computer Security MT24, Clark-Wilson model]]?
- [[Notes - Computer Security MT24, Access control in UNIX]]?
- [[Notes - Computer Security MT24, Reference monitors]]U
- [[Notes - Computer Security MT24, Attacks]]U
- [[Notes - Computer Security MT24, Symmetric key ciphers]]U
- [[Notes - Computer Security MT24, Cipher attacks]]U
- [[Notes - Computer Security MT24, Feistel structures]]U
- [[Notes - Computer Security MT24, DES cryptosystem]]U
- [[Notes - Computer Security MT24, Cryptographic hashes]]U
- [[Notes - Computer Security MT24, Key generation]]U
- [[Notes - Computer Security MT24, Asymmetric key ciphers]]U
- [[Notes - Computer Security MT24, Number theory]]U
- [[Notes - Computer Security MT24, RSA cryptosystem]]U
- [[Notes - Computer Security MT24, Rabin cryptosystem]]U
- [[Notes - Computer Security MT24, Diffie-Hellman key exchange]]U
- [[Notes - Computer Security MT24, Dolev-Yao model]]U
- [[Notes - Computer Security MT24, MACs]]U
- [[Notes - Computer Security MT24, Digital signatures]]U
- [[Notes - Computer Security MT24, Protocols]]U
- [[Notes - Computer Security MT24, Needham-Schroeder protocol]]U
- [[Notes - Computer Security MT24, Key distribution and mediated authentication]]U
- [[Notes - Computer Security MT24, SSL and TLS]]U
Problem Sheets
- [[Problem Sheet - Computer Security MT24, I]]?, Sheet 1
- [[Problem Sheet - Computer Security MT24, II]]?
- [[Problem Sheet - Computer Security MT24, III]]?
- [[Problem Sheet - Computer Security MT24, IV]]?
- From the previous year:
To-do List
- Go over all topics covered in slides but not covered in lectures
- Address todo items in notes above
- Example of a buffer overflow attack
-
Details of RC4 stream cipher?
- Explanation in slides is better
- Go back over message integrity 4.5 if not covered later in the notes
- Why does MD-compliant padding prevent “these attacks” (and what does “these” refer to?)
- Details for specific hashing algorithms like MD4?
- Better definition of cryptanalysis given in the slides
- Diagrams for Fiestel structures/other ciphers
- Luby-Rackoff theorem
- Slides give better explanation of block ciphers vs. stream ciphers
-
Slides also have a list of more weaknesses for each block mode, and illustrations are useful
- Should refactor block modes into a separate entry
- Pseudocode for what exhaustion attacks look like on hash properties
- Details for time complexity of RSA operations
- Why the specific choices made in PKCS#1 v1.5
- Go over the slides for the lectures I missed (OAEP for RSA?)
- Details on elliptic-curve cryptography in the slides
- Why do RSA signatures work?
- Padding for RSA signatures, PKCS and RSA-PSS
- Retransmission attack for confidentiality with authentication
- Why is it preferable that the initiator should be first to prove their identity (page 114)
- More details on certificates in the slides
- Attacks on TLS?
- Lecturer said that there is always a big focus on protocols in the exam